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At sea, prudent mariners constantly strive to be keenly aware of the location of
all nearby ports and harbors. Should a ship encounter foul weather or suffer
mechanical or structural failures, a captain's ability to get her ship to sheltered
waters could be the difference between life and death. Many mariners put their
faith in a concept vaguely referred to as 'force majeure." They believe that this
concept will allow them to lawfully seek shelter in the closest harbor, regardless
of nationality. In short, they believe that in the event of danger, they will be able
to run to any port in a storm.
Despite this belief, the author demonstrates that the question of whether a
coastal state will grant entry to a distressed ship is now highly debatable. The
author analyzes two recent high-profile cases, the Erika and the Castor, where
European coastal states denied entry to distressed vessels, primarily out of
environmental and political concerns. The author then examines the legal
obligations of coastal states regarding distressed ships. He finds no definitive
answers. In fact, the author finds sound legal and policy arguments on both sides
of the issue, highlighting the confused state of international law in this area. He
then turns to the efforts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The
IMO is considering implementation of a voluntary regime of pre-designated
places of refuge, partly in response to the treatment of the Erika and the Castor.
The author questions the IMO's plan on both legal and policy grounds. In the
alternative, he proposes an integrated case by case approach for dealing with
distressed ships that he argues would be both more effective and consistent with
international law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Emergency situations at sea implicate, at times, difficult and ambiguous
aspects of international, environmental, and maritime law. In turn, these legal
issues may involve dynamic interaction between state actors, non-state actors, and
international institutions. They may raise concerns of safety, environmental
protection, state sovereignty, self-defense, and treaty interpretation and
application. This note analyzes two recent controversial events that have
crystallized these issues and concerns.
Specifically, this note tells the tale of two tanker ships, the Erika and the
Castor. Both ships found themselves in distress on the high seas, with cracks in
their decks and oil in their holds. Both ships requested permission from coastal
authorities to enter protected waters. European coastal states, naturally fearful of
the environmental and political consequences that harboring a large disabled
vessel might raise, refused entry to both ships.
The Erika was ultimately destroyed, its hull split open by the relentless power
of the North Atlantic. The oil it was carrying spoiled the French coast. 1 Its crew
was miraculously saved by a combined search-and-rescue force from the French
Coastguard, the French Navy, and the British Royal Navy. The Castor was
ultimately spared by the seas, but only after a hellish forty days at sea and a series
of harrowing at-sea rescue and cargo removal operations performed by Spanish
search-and-rescue forces and commercial mariners. 2 Both incidents highlight
difficult tensions and ambiguities in international law.
First, for centuries ships in distress on the high seas have enjoyed a right of
entry into the waters of coastal states. Such entry had to be necessary for the
safety of the vessel or its crew.3 The ship's predicament typically had to be
caused by some condition of force majeure or distress.4
The right of entry is now codified under the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), discussed below.5 It is an exception or defense
to the coastal state's exercise of jurisdiction over the disabled ship.6 This
I See Clare Garner, Diesel Oil Tanker Snaps in Two off the French Coast, INDEPENDENT
(London), Dec. 13, 1999, at9.
2 See Safety-Saving the Castor, LLOYD'S LiST (London), Feb. 15, 2001, at 14.
3 See C. JOHN COLUMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 353, at 329-30 (6th
ed. 1967).
4 Force Majeure: "[Law French 'a superior force'] An event or effect that can be neither
anticipated nor controlled; the term includes both acts of nature (such as floods and hurricanes),
and acts of people (such as hots, strikes, and wars) ... Cf. ACT OF GOD." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 263 (pocket ed. 1996).
5 See U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE SEA at 6-7, U.N.
Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983).
6 See id.
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exception or defense to the coastal state's jurisdiction prohibits, inter alia, the
coastal state from excluding the disabled ship from its territorial sea. Arguably,
both Erika and Castor, as ships in distress, should have been entitled to this right
of entry. 7
Second, and conversely, coastal states have an inherent right of self-defense.
This right in some circumstances arguably gives states the right to keep dangerous
ships away from their shores. Further, coastal states have sovereign duties to
protect their populations and their environmentally sensitive coastal areas. These
concerns make coastal states naturally wary of allowing disabled vessels carrying
hazardous cargoes into their waters. Consequently, as illustrated by the Erika and
Castor incidents, some coastal states are not allowing disabled vessels into their
waters. Coastal states have justified their actions on several legal and factual
grounds, discussed below. This tension in international law8 has motivated the
International Maritime Organization ("IMO") to consider adopting a regime of
pre-designated places of refuge.9 The basic idea is that coastal states would have
at least one area where vessels in distress could seek shelter. The IMO is currently
drafting non-mandatory guidelines in this field.'0 Given the ambiguous state of
international law in this field, such a scheme is on questionable legal ground. It is
a poor public policy choice.
The IMO's plan, while well intended, is misguided. The IMO should
continue to focus on doing what it does best-raising international shipping
7 See infra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
8 See Kristina Martin, Note, Conflicts in Marine Environmental Protection: The Turkish
Straits as a Case Study, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 681,702 (1999).
The necessity for coastal states to protect their marine and coastal environment is
undisputed, particularly in an age where eighty percent of international trade takes place
over the oceans and much of what is being transported is hazardous material. The conflict
between the right of innocent passage or freedom of transit and the need to create
mandatory systems to control the flow of maritime traffic is fundamentally a political and
economic one. But increased risk of collision where the numbers [sic] of vessels traveling
the seas without the security of some sort of superfund or the preventative measures of
vessel traffic systems will lead to disaster. This is particularly the case in geographical
areas such as straits, where conditions are such that the risk of collision or grounding is
highest. Coastal states must be permitted not only to regulate their territorial seas but also
to exercise some amount of jurisdiction where foreign vessels do not comply, for the
economic and environmental burden falls on their shoulders. More authority should be
granted to the IMO to work together with coastal states in the implementation and
enforcement of regulations to prevent vessel-source pollution of the marine environment.
Id.
9 See "Places of Refuge "-A Priority Issue for IMO, IMO Maritime Safety Commission,
at http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/contents.asp?topicid=67&doc-id=1059 (June 8, 2000).
10 See Lowery et al., Shock as Castor's Salvor Has Award Slashed by a Third, LLOYD'S
LIST (London), May 23, 2002, at 1.
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standards and encouraging flag state responsibility. I' At the same time, the right
of entry for vessels in distress should be preserved. Incidents like the Erika and
the Castor should be dealt with on a case by case basis. Rather than forcing all
disabled vessels, no matter what their particular circumstances, to transit to a pre-
designated place of refuge, a case by case approach would allow coastal
authorities, rescue personnel, and professional mariners to work together to make
the best of a bad situation--preserving life and property at sea, while protecting
coastal populations and environmentally sensitive coastal areas. The integration
of the global maritime community through technological and legal regimes such
as Automated Identification Systems ("AIS"), highlights the feasibility,
practicability, and desirability of a case by case approach.12
This note analyzes the recent Erika and Castor incidents. 13 It then analyzes
the tension between a distressed ship's right of entry and the rights of coastal
states. 14 This note then analyzes the IMO's pre-designated places of refuge
concept. 15 In the end, the IMO's plan, while well-intended, is not well-suited to
meet its objective. 16 A major factor in isolated casualties like the Erika and the
Castor incidents is substandard shipping. 17 In the short term, adopting pre-
designated places of refuge will have the effect of keeping substandard shipping
in distress at sea longer.18 It will also further erode the right of entry.19 Neither of
these will measurably improve the quality of international shipping.20 In fact, the
IMO's plan could put coastal states and mariners in greater danger.21
11 See Montreal-IMO Shipping Safety Culture Also Applies to Ports Says O'Neil,
LLOYD's LIST (London), May 24,2001, at 22.
12 See Molly Kavanaugh, Tougher Maritime Security is Focus of Great Lakes Meetings,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 31, 2002, at B1. AIS integrates global positioning data,
electronic navigational charts, shipboard transponders, and shore-based command and control
facilities. See Captain Robert G. Ross, United States Coast Guard, Briefing, Technical
Innovations in Navigation Safety, Slides 26-29, at http://www.uscg.mil/vtm/briefs/
TRB_alsldOO.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002). They provide Vessel Traffic Services (VTS)
with real-time information regarding the position and movement of commercial ships within
their area of operation. Id This same information is available to all other ships transiting in a
given area. AIS is akin to an air-traffic control system. Id In a shipboard emergency, AIS
greatly reduces the response time of professional search-and-rescue personnel. Id. AIS also
enhances the ability of nearby commercial mariners to respond and assist. Id.
13 See infra notes 22-57 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 66-166 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 170-214 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 184-214 and accompanying text.
17 See id.
18 See id
19 See infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
20 See infra note 214.
21 See infra note 212.
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II. ERIKA & CASTOR-NOT IN MY BACKYARD
Recent events suggest that the noble tradition of sheltering distressed ships is
disappearing. It may already be gone. Consider the stories of the Erika and the
Castor--tanker ships which plead for entry into the protected waters of European
coastal states only to be left to the mercy of the high seas.
A. Erika-Disaster on the French Coast
In December 1999, the Erika, a twenty-five year old, 590-foot tanker
registered in Malta, was traveling from the Netherlands to Livorno, Italy. 22 It was
carrying 26,000 tons of diesel oil.23 On this voyage, the Erika encountered severe
weather conditions with winds in excess of sixty miles per hour. The ship was
battered by the relentless power of the North Atlantic. 24
According to the ship's captain, Karan Sundar Mathur, the Erika sent out a
distress call on December 11, 1999.25 There is a dispute over this fact, though, as
local French authorities denied that a request was made.26 The captain then
allegedly requested permission to enter the French port of Saint Nazaire, citing
"serious structural problems." 27 Here again, there is another dispute on the facts
since, according to the French Navy, the call was allegedly canceled by the ship
an hour later.28 At 6 A.M. on December 12, the Erika, pounded by the relentless
power of the Atlantic Ocean, split in half seventy miles south of Brest.29 On
December 13, the Erika sank 30
The French Navy and Coastguard lacked the helicopter capacity to rescue
Erika's twenty-seven person crew initially. 3' The French government requested
assistance from the British Royal Navy, which was equipped with large Sea King
22 See David Montgomery & Susan Bell, Stricken Tanker Breaks in Two, SCOTSMAN,
Dec. 13, 1999, at 5.
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 See Vaiju Naravane, The Master is All at Sea, HINDu (India), Dec. 25, 1999,
www.lexis.com, News Group File, All.
26 See id.
27 Montgomery & Bell, supra note 22; see also Naravane, supra note 25.
28 See Naravane, supra note 25.
29 See id Brest is a city located in the Brittany region of France. Brittany, the western most
region of France, is a large peninsula with 750 miles of coastline.
30 See Naravane, supra note 25.
31 See Montgomery & Bell, supra note 22.
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helicopters. 32 The combined force was able to dramatically rescue all twenty-
seven members of Erika's crew.33
Ten-thousand tons of the oil carried by the Erika spilled along the French
coast.34 Experts described the Erika incident as the "worst oil disaster in
European history." 35 The oil slick killed more than 200,000 birds.36 It blackened
beaches. 37 The vacation season was jeopardized for the region's 750,000
tourists. 38 Erika's captain was subsequently arrested for violating France's
domestic environmental laws.39
32 See id.
33 See id The rescue of personnel from the disintegrating deck of the Erika is a
compelling tale of heroism and teamwork under pressure:
Earlier, two Royal Navy helicopters helped the French coastguard to lift all 26 crew
to safety from the 590-foot vessel, about 70 miles south of Brest, the main port of Brittany.
As the first five crew members were rescued by a French navy [sic] Super Frelon
helicopter, the tanker broke into two pieces. Most of the remaining crew scrambled into
the stem while others took refuge in the tanker's life boats.
They were winched to safety in a dramatic manoeuvre involving two Royal Navy
Sea King helicopters from RNAS Culdrose, Cornwall. The French coastguards at Etel had
made the request for the Sea Kings because a local helicopter was capable of carrying only
five people.
Lt Fraser Hunt [sic], the pilot of one of the Royal Navy helicopters, said his aircraft
helped search the scene for crew as French helicopters winched them to safety. "It was
very rough. The bow of the tanker was in one place and the superstructure was about a
quarter of a mile away."
Id.
34 See Tim Finan & Stephen Bevan, Oil Death Toll May Rise to 300,000 Birds, SuNDAY
TIMEs (London), Jan. 9, 2000, at 28; see also Garner, supra note 1.
35 Fman & Bevan, supra note 34.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See Naravane, supra note 25. Some considered the captain's arrest ironic given the fact
that it appears French authorities had denied safe harbor to the Erika. Public opinion on the
Erika incident in France was divided
between the ship owner, who sent out an unsafe vessel; the French oil company Total-
Fina, which chartered the ship without proper checks; and French authorities who failed to
inspect the ship in Dunkirk and refused it entry to the port of refuge at St Nazaire [sic],
sending the captain back out to founder in the storm.
Jonathan Wills, French Join Forces to Combat Tide of Oil Spills, SCOTSMAN, Jan. 28, 2000, at
18.
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B. Castor-A "Pariah Ship" and a Near Miss
Next, in December 2000, the Castor was navigating the Mediterranean Sea
on its voyage from Constanza, Romania to Lagos, Nigeria.40 Castor, a Cyprus
flagged tanker4' built in 1977,42 was carrying 29,500 tons of gasoline.43
Encountering severe winter weather, including a force-12 gale, the Castor
developed a twenty-six meter crack across its main deck.44
Thus began Castor's forty day, 1000 mile saga.45 Nearly crippled by rough
seas, the Castor sought sheltered waters in which it could offload its cargo, for the
safety of the ship, her crew, and nearby coastal states.46 On New Year's Eve,
Morocco denied Castor's request.47 Castor's plea for shelter was subsequently
denied by Algeria, France, Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain, and Tunisia.48
Spain allegedly feared that the grinding metal from the crack on the ship's
deck would create sparks that might cause the ship's cargo to ignite.49 However,
there is serious doubt that the Castor posed any risk of explosion. 50 In addition,
Castor was merely seeking sheltered waters, a place of protection from which to
offload her cargo and effect minor repairs, so Castor need not have entered a port
facility. 51 Spanish search-and-rescue authorities evacuated many of the ship's
crew on the high seas.52
Finally, after forty days as a homeless pariah, wandering the Mediterranean
for 1000 miles, Castor's gasoline cargo was offloaded onto two shuttle tankers in
a risky at-sea transfer operation in exposed waters off the coast of Malta.53
40 See Donald Urquhart, Stricken Vessel Off Europe Denied Refuge, Bus. TIMES
(Singapore), Jan. 12,2001, Shipping Times, at 1.
41 See Donald Urquhart, Outcast Castor's 40-day Ordeal Close to End, Bus. TMES
(Singapore), Feb. 20,2001, at 1.
42 See id.
43 See Urquhart, supra note 40.
44 See id.; Brian Reyes, Salvage: Salvage Chief Warns That 'Leper' Ship Will Sink,
LLOYD'S LIST (London), Jan. 29, 2001, at 3.
45 See Reyes, supra note 44.
46 See id.
47 See Urquhart, supra note 40.
48 See id.
49 See David Hughes, Priorities Must be Identified When Handling Casualties, Bus.
TimES (Singapore), Jan. 15, 2001, Shipping Times, at 2.
50 See Montreal-IMO Shipping Safety Culture Also Applies to Ports Says O'Neil, supra
note 11.
51 See id.
52 See Urquhart, supra note 41.
53 See Urquhart, supra note 40.
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Malta's refusal to grant shelter to the Castor is perhaps ironic, given that Malta
was the flag state of the Erika.54
Many of the coastal states involved in the incident decried the Castor as a
substandard ship.55 They argued that their citizens should not be put at risk
because of a substandard ship.56 Yet there is a dispute over the facts as to this
point. According to the American Bureau of Shipping, the vessel's classification
society, the Castor was a properly maintained, seaworthy vessel that simply
incurred damage from heavy weather.57 The fact that the Castor was able to
remain afloat for forty days on the high seas, despite the large crack in its deck,
arguably supports this contention.
III. TENSION
The Erika and Castor incidents highlight an area of difficult tension and
ambiguity in international law. What is the status of a distressed ship's right of
entry for reasons of force majeure or distress?58 On the one hand, under
customary international law and UNCLOS, distressed ships have a right of entry
into the territorial sea of coastal states.59 Conversely, there must be some limit to
a distressed ship's right of entry. Coastal states have an inherent right of self-
14 See id.
55 See David Hughes, Issue of Scrapping Hazardous Ships Becoming More Pressing,
Bus. TiMES (Singapore), Feb. 26, 2001, at 1; 'Super-rust' Threat, LLOYD's LIST (London), Apr.
10, 2001, at 1.
56 See Hughes, supra note 55; 'Super-rust' Threat, supra note 55.
57 See Julian Bray, Conference-'Squabbling' LACS Told to Work as a Team, LLOYD'S
LIST (London), Apr. 11, 2001, at 3.
58 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 263 (defmningforce majeure).
59 See COLUMBOS, supra note 3, § 353, at 329-30:
When a ship is driven to take refuge in a foreign port by stress of weather, or is compelled
to do so byforce majeure or any other overruling necessity, she is not subject to the local
regulations of the port with regard to any incapacity, penalty, prohibition, duties or taxes in
force at that port. This rule was affirmed as far back as 1809 by Lord Stowell in The
Eleanor, where he held that "real and irresistible distress," proved by clear and satisfactory
evidence, "must be at all times a sufficient passport for human beings," entitling them to
the rights of hospitality in a British port. The French Court of Cassation also decided in
The Carlo-Alberto that a ship in distress "is placed, among civilised nations, under the
protection of good faith, humanity, and generosity."... In order to exempt, however, a
vessel from the local regulations, it is required "that the necessity be urgent and proceed
from such a state of things as may be supposed to produce, on the mind of a skillful
mariner, a well-grounded apprehension of the loss of the vessel and cargo or the lives of
the crew." The rule based on circumstances of force majeure extends to ships seeking
refuge in a foreign port for vital repairs or a strict necessity of provisioning.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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defense and sovereign duties to protect their populations and environmentally
sensitive coastal areas. 60 Additionally, one could argue that, based on the facts of
each case and their attendant circumstances, the Erika and the Castor might not
have been entitled to invoke the defense of right of entry as an exception to
coastal state jurisdiction.61
A. Right of Entry for Reasons of Force Majeure or Distress
The right of entry is essentially a defense for a ship against the exercise of
jurisdiction by the coastal state.62 If a ship can validly assert this defense, it is
generally not subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal state.63 This means, inter
alia, that the coastal state's ability to exclude the distressed vessel from its
territorial sea is greatly diminished.64 All of the states involved in both incidents
were bound by the rules that give a distressed ship a right of entry, either under
UNCLOS or as a matter of mandatory customary international law.65
1. A Distressed Ship's Right of Entry
Under customary international law that is now codified in various
instruments, including UNCLOS, ships enjoy the right of innocent passage.66
This means that ships have the right to transit through the territorial sea of a
coastal state, provided such passage is innocent.67 UNCLOS contains a list of
situations when a ship's passage could fail to be classified as innocent, in which
case the coastal state will obtain jurisdiction over that ship.68 Thus, the
60 See infra notes 111-27 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 22-57 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See infra notes 87-109 and accompanying text.
66 The territorial sea of a coastal state can extend up to twelve nautical miles from that
state's baseline. The baseline is an imaginary line that roughly corresponds to the low-water line
along the coast. The limits of a coastal state's jurisdiction are measured from this line. The
coastal state exercises some sovereignty in its territorial sea. However, the coastal state does not
have the authority to hinder passage of foreign vessels through the territorial sea. This right of
foreign vessels to transit through the territorial sea of another state is known as innocent
passage. See ARND BERNAERTS, BERNAERTS' GUIDE TO THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE 1982
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 27-28 (1988). See generally MYRON H. NORDQUIST, UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY (Martin Nijhoff ed.,
publishers ed. 1989) (explaining the function and operation of the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea).
67 See BERNAERTS, supra note 66, at 28.
68 Id. UNCLOS defines innocent passage as "[t]ransitory navigation... [that must] not be
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presumption is that a ship transiting through the territorial sea of a coastal state is
not subject to the jurisdiction of that coastal state.69
In the territorial sea, the coastal state does exercise some jurisdiction.70
However, the general structure of international law is that freedom of navigation
is the presumption.71 The territorial sea is a grant of limited jurisdiction to the
coastal state.72 International law also grants some jurisdiction to coastal states in
the form of the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone ("EEZ").73
However, as long as a ship is merely transiting through the territorial sea of a
coastal state and does not engage in any activity which threatens the rights of the
coastal state such that its passage would no longer be considered innocent, it
enjoys the freedom of navigation.74 The general rule is that transit must be
"continuous and expeditious." 75 This means that the ship cannot stop and loiter in
the territorial sea.76
However, there is an exception. When a ship is forced to transit through the
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state." Id. UNCLOS includes an
explanatory list of activities that would put a ship outside of innocent passage including "any
other activity not having a direct bearing on passage... practice with weapons... [and] serious
pollution." Id. Also, the "foreign vessel must be in passage, i.e., in transit through the territorial
sea between any two points not in this zone, and the passage must be continuous and
expeditious . I... d If a foreign vessel's conduct qualifies as innocent passage, "a coastal state
may not exercise its jurisdiction ... unless there is a serious threat to the coastal state." Id. See
generally NoRDQUIST, supra note 66 (explaining the function and operation of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea).
69 See BERNAERTS, supra note 66, at 27-28. See generally NORDQUIST, supra note 66
(explaining the function and operation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea).
70 See BERNAERTS, supra note 66, at 27-28. See generally NORDQUIST, supra note 66
(explaining the function and operation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea).
71 See BERNAERTS, supra note 66, at 27-28. See generally NORDQUIST, supra note 66
(explaining the function and operation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea).
72 See BERNAERTS, supra note 66, at 27-28. See generally NORDQUIST, supra note 66
(explaining the function and operation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea).
73 See BERNAERTS, supra note 66, at 27-28. The contiguous zone extends for twenty-four
nautical miles beyond the baseline. Id. It encompasses the territorial sea. Id. States are not
automatically entitled to a contiguous zone under international law. Id. They must properly
declare a contiguous zone. Id. Within the contiguous zone, coastal states have some limited
jurisdiction with regard to enforcement of customs laws. Id. It is used primarily to regulate
commerce that is bound for the coastal state itself to facilitate enforcement of its own domestic
laws. Id. The EEZ grants states some control over the natural resources in the waters up to 200
nautical miles from the baseline. Id. See generally NORDQUIST, supra note 66 (explaining the
function and operation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea).
74 See BERNAERTS, supra note 66, at 27-28 (defining innocent passage and when it
applies).
75 Id.
76 See id.
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territorial sea of a state and stop there, for reasons of force majeure or distress,
such passage is deemed innocent.77 This principle, incorporated in UNCLOS, is
an ancient and well-established principle of customary international law.78 It was
such an important exception to coastal state jurisdiction that it was incorporated
into UNCLOS without debate or controversy. 79 Thus, when a vessel is forced to
77 See id. Under normal circumstances, a vessel transiting through the territorial sea is
considered to be engaged in innocent passage and is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of
the coastal state. Id. Being outside the jurisdiction of the coastal state would in turn mean, inter
alia, that the coastal state would have difficulty in excluding that vessel from the territorial sea.
Id. Normally, the vessel's passage must be "continuous and expeditious." Id. However, the
vessel's presence within the territorial sea can be considered innocent, and thus beyond the
coastal state's jurisdiction, "for navigational purposes and other acceptable reasons." Id. at 28
(emphasis added). Force majeure and distress are defined by UNCLOS as such "other
acceptable reasons." Id. at 27-28. Articles 17 and 18 of UNCLOS are on point. They state in
part:
Article 17
Right of innocent passage
Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.
Article 18
Meaning of passage
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping and
anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are
rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance
to persons, ships, or aircraft in danger or distress.
U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 5, at 6 (emphasis added). Thus, Articles
17 and 18 provide that a ship forced to stop in the territorial sea of a state for reasons of force
majeure or distress is still considered to be engaged in innocent passage. Thus, if a ship engaged
in innocent passage is forced to stop in the territorial sea of a coastal state for reasons of force
majeure or distress, that ship arguably is still engaged in innocent passage. This in turn means
that the coastal state would not have jurisdiction over that ship and would therefore, inter alia,
be unable to order that ship out of its territorial sea. Id. at 158. Note that UNCLOS operates
generally to give flag states the broad right to use the world's oceans and doles out limited
exceptions to the general rule where coastal states may exercise some jurisdiction. See Margaret
L. Tomlinson, Recent Developments in the International Law of the Sea, 32 INT'L LAW. 599,
600 (1998). Under UNCLOS, flag states have "the protection of freedom to use ocean space
without undue interference." Id. See generally NORDQUIST, supra note 66 (explaining the
function and operation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea).
78 See COLOMBOS, supra note 3, § 353, at 329-30.
79 There is no drafting history surrounding adoption of the force majeure exception to
coastal state jurisdiction over the territorial sea. This lack of controversy and debate suggests
that the drafters of UNCLOS simply accepted force majeure as such, an ancient and long-
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enter the territorial sea of a state due to an extreme condition, all of the rules
discussed above about innocent passage apply to that ship.80 The coastal state
does not have jurisdiction over that ship.81
Thus, it is settled international law that a foreign vessel has the right to enter
the territorial sea of a coastal state when such entry is necessary for the safety of
the vessel or persons aboard.82 The distressed vessel must leave the territorial sea
once the conditions that made the entry necessary have ceased to exist.83
2. The Obligations of the Specific Coastal States at Issue
In understanding the Erika and Castor incidents and their relationship to the
right of entry, it is helpful to examine the obligations of the coastal states in
question. UNCLOS went into force on November 16, 1994.84 The coastal states
at issue, with the exception of Gibraltar, had all ratified UNCLOS by the time of
the Erika and Castor incidents. 85 The flag states, Malta and Cyprus, had also each
ratified UNCLOS by the time of the incident, so there is no issue of mutuality
which might somehow excuse the coastal states' actions. 86 Each state filed
declarations with its ratification.87 None of the declarations in any way suggest
standing principle of international law that was incorporated into UNCLOS without dissent. See
generally NORDQUIST, supra note 66, (explaining the function and operation of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea); LAw OF THE SEA: THE COMMON HERITAGE AND EMERGING
CHALLENGES (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2000) (discussing the history, development, and new
challenges of the law of the sea and the role of force majeure); TULLIO TREVES, New Trends in
the Settlement of Disputes and the Law of the Sea Convention, in LAW OF THE SEA: THE
COMMON HERITAGE AND EMERGING CHALLENGES, supra, at 61, 61-62 (noting that coastal
states can use international dispute resolution tribunals to resolve environmental problems);
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOcuMENTS, AND READINGS (Gary Knight &
Hungdah Chiu eds., 1991) (analyzing the international law of the sea through diverse and
compelling perspectives).
80 See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 4, at 263 (defining force majeure).
84 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Division for
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/
conventionagreements.htm (last modified Sept. 10, 2002).
85 See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of Accessions and Successions to the
Convention and Related Agreements as of 12 November 2001, United Nations Division for
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, at http://www.un.org/Deptsflos/reference_files/
chronological lists of ratifications.htm (last updated Sept. 27, 2002).
86 See id.
87 See id.
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that these coastal states did not feel bound by Articles 17 and 18.88 On the
contrary, two of the declarations explicitly stress the importance of a limitation to
their jurisdiction over the territorial sea in cases of force majeure.
Specifically, Spain's declaration purports to limit somewhat the scope of
Article 39, paragraph 3(a), "except for force majeure or serious difficulty."89
Similarly, Algeria's declaration purports to require advance notification for
warships transiting through its territorial sea, "except in cases of force majeure as
provided in the Convention."90 These two declarations highlight coastal states
acknowledgment of the importance of the force majeure exception to coastal state
jurisdiction.91 They demonstrate that these states were not only aware of the force
majeure limitation on their jurisdiction.92 Rather they recognized the force
majeure exception to jurisdiction was such a clear and important principle of
international law that they wanted to be certain it survived their declarations.93
The declarations highlight that at least those two states believed force majeure
was a doctrine worthy of reaffirming. 94
That these two states later denied entry to a vessel in distress, the Castor, a
vessel that had a colorable claim to entry for reasons of force majeure, is
important. The record, as evidenced through their declarations, is that they knew
about the right of entry and thought it was important.95 Yet, their actions taken in
the Castor incident contradict this longstanding principle of international law.96
Their affirmation of the right of entry for reasons of force majeure puts them in an
awkward position and weighs against arguments they raised against the Castor's
right of entry.97
Gibraltar, which has not yet ratified UNCLOS, also was, and continues to be,
obligated to permit vessels in distress to enter its territorial sea for two reasons.
First, UNCLOS itself is generally accepted to reflect mandatory customary
88 See supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
89 Spain's Declarations to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United
Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
conventionagreements/convention declarations.htm#Spain (last modified Sept. 17, 2002)
(emphasis added).
90 Algeria's Declarations to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United
Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
conventionagreements/convention declarations.htm#Algeria (last modified Sept. 17, 2002)
(emphasis added).
91 See supra notes 89-90.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
97 See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
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international law that binds all states.98 Second, as discussed above, the principle
of force najeure itself is such an ancient and established doctrine in international
law that its status as mandatory customary international law is not seriously
debated.99
Thus, a distressed ship's right of entry is settled international law.1° Every
coastal state involved in the Erika and Castor incidents had an obligation, either
as a matter of treaty or as a matter of customary international law-and in most
cases bothd-to grant safe harbor to vessels in distress.'10 Erika and Castor were
clearly vessels in distress. 10 2 Both vessels clearly had "a sense of urgency in
seeking refuge" and not just entry as a "mere matter of convenience in making
repairs or in avoiding a measure of difficulty in navigation." 10 3 As such, both
98 See Ted L. McDoman, Port State Enforcement: A Comment on Article 218 of the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention, 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 305, 305 (1997):
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)
establishes the constitutional framework for the exercise of national jurisdiction over ocean
space, resources, and activities. The treaty came into effect for ratifying States in
November 1994. That prominent ocean users such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada are not yet parties is usually treated as a technical matter
unrelated to the adoption of much of the LOS Convention into national practice and
international law.
(emphasis added).
99 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900):
[In] [ilntemational law ... resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years
of labor, research, and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with
the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to... for trustworthy evidence of
what the law really is.
See also 2 ERASTUs BENEDICT ET AL., BENEDICT ON ADMIRALITY § 112(a) (2001):
Under unusual circumstances called "distress," foreign vessels entering a state's territorial
waters are ordinarily accorded immunity from administration of local customs laws.
However, distress requires a sense of urgency in seeking refuge and not just entry as a
"mere matter of convenience in making repairs or in avoiding a measure of difficulty in
navigation.";
COLOMBOS, supra note 3, § 353, at 329-30 (noting that force majeure has sustained a distressed
ship's right of entry since 1809); John Waite, Confusion on Ports of Safe Haven, LLOYD'S LIST
(London), Sept. 17, 2001, at 19 (noting that the Castor incident "highlights deficiencies in [the]
understanding of international law regarding vessels in distress seeking shelter").
100 See supra notes 66-99 and accompanying text.
101 See id.
102 See supra notes 22-57 and accompanying text.
103 2 BENEDICT ET AL., supra note 99, § 112(a).
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vessels had the right to enter the territorial sea of the nearest coastal state. 10 4 None
of the coastal states involved in either incident met that obligation. 10 5 These
states, therefore, arguably violated their obligations under public international
law.106
On the other hand, the facts of the Erika and Castor incidents could be
construed as not giving rise to the right of entry.10 7 The exercise of the right of
entry implies that ships are forced into the territorial sea such that not entering the
territorial sea is impossible. 10 8 In both the Erika and the Castor cases, the masters
requested permission to enter from the coastal state. 1°9 This is a slightly different
scenario than what seems to be envisioned by the law. 110
10 4 See id.
105 See supra notes 22-57 and accompanying text.
106 See 2 BENEDICr Er AL., supra note 99, § 112(a).
107 See Focus on Ship Safety Not Ports of Refuge Says Spain, LLOYD's LIST (London),
Jan. 11, 2001, at 1.
108 See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY, supra note 4, at 263 (definingforce majeure).
109 See supra notes 25-28, 46-49 and accompanying text.
110 Conceptually, the right of entry and the doctrine of force majeure are rules of
hindsight. For example, the basic idea is that authorities of a coastal state wake up one morning,
look out into the harbor after a storm, and see a foreign flagged ship at anchor. Perhaps they
then instruct their local coast guard, border patrol, or harbor master to go aboard the ship and
conduct an administrative inspection. If the ship was forced to enter the coastal state's waters
due to horrific weather conditions, for example, the master could invoke the right of entry. She
could argue that, although she is at anchor and thus stopped in the territorial sea, her ship is
there because of some circumstance of force majeure. Thus, the right of entry would protect
that ship from the coastal state's exercise of jurisdiction.
The meaning of force majeure can also be gleaned from the language of the draft articles
on state responsibility for wrongful acts. See Commentaries to the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for International Wrongfd Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
at 48-49, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State-
responsibility/responsibility-commentaries(e).pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2002). Articles 23 and
24 provide exceptions for state responsibility for reasons of force majeure or distress. See id.
Under Article 23, a state can be excused from its obligations if it is forced to do so for reasons
of an "irresistible force" or "unforeseen event." Id This force majeure exception is inapplicable,
though, if the situation arises due to the state's own conduct or as a result of a risk assumed by
the state. See id. The language in Article 24 on distress has a similar limitation. See id. This
explanatory language does not appear in UNCLOS. One could argue therefore that the concept
of force majeure and distress are broader under UNCLOS than they are under the Law of State
Responsibility. However, that seems to be a strained construction. The better reading is that the
Draft Articles provide greater clarity as to what distress and force majeure mean. Since the
same terms are used in both documents, they must have very similar if not identical meanings.
Thus, an implied limitation on the right of entry for reasons of force majeure or distress could
be construed in UNCLOS itself.
Additionally, part of the confusion over the right of entry and the doctrine of force majeure
stems from the fact that these ships are not just showing up in foreign ports when forced to do
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B. The Coastal State's Right of Self-Defense
Additionally, weighing against the right of entry are the rights and needs of
coastal states. States can be excused from breaching their international obligations
for reasons of self-defense. I II Thus, even if a flag state were to take up its ship's
so due to extreme weather conditions. Modem communication technology gives masters the
ability to notify coastal authorities of their problems as they develop. Thus, vessels in distress
are in communication with coastal authorities in a way not envisioned by our customary
international law principles that originated from a time when a ship at sea might as well have
been in the deep reaches of space. Indeed, that a master is asking for permission to enter the
territorial sea of a coastal state could itself be evidence of a lack of a circumstance of force
majeure. If masters still have sufficient control over their vessels such that they are capable of
requesting permission to enter port as opposed to simply being driven into port against their will
by the elements, then arguably the circumstances do not yet give rise to the right of entry. This
is the area from which the confusion stems.
I11 See id at 124-33. The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts were promulgated by the International Law Commission, an arm of the United
Nations, in 2001. While not adopted as a treaty in force, the Draft Articles are generally
understood to represent mandatory customary international law. See id. The reason for this is
that they are generally understood to reflect state practice. See id The Draft Articles suggest
that a state may breach international law to defend itself. This is logical because a state's
inherent right of self-defense is paramount under international law. Self-defense naturally
enjoys exalted status on the hierarchy of international rights and obligations. Thus, even if any
of the states involved in the Erika and Castor incidents did breach an international obligation.
under UNCLOS, inter alia, the Draft Articles suggest that such a breach may be permissible
under international law if it is necessary for self-defense:
Chapter III
Breach of an international obligation
Article 12
Existence of a breach of an international obligation
There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is
not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or
character.
Article 13
International obligation inforcefor a state
An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the
State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.
Article 15
Breach consisting of a composite act
1. The breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of actions or
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cause and argue that a coastal state's denial of that ship's entry violates its
international obligations, 112 something that factually did not happen in either the
Erika or Castor incidents, that coastal state would have a strong argument that its
denial of entry was justified on the grounds of self-defense.11 3
In international law, self-defense is typically thought of in military terms.114
A typical self-defense analysis focuses on whether military action taken by a state
was justified by self-defense. 115 To be justified, it is generally accepted that a
omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful, occurs when the action or omission occurs
which, taken with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful
act.
2. In such a case, the breach extends over the entire period starting with the first of the
actions or omissions of the series and lasts for as long as these actions or omissions are
repeated and remain not in conformity with the international obligation.
Chapter V
Circumstances precluding wrongfulness
Article 21 Self-defence
The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful
measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
Id at 46-47, 48.
112 First, it would have to be established that one of the coastal states breached its
international obligations. Although the law at issue here is a multilateral treaty, the alleged
injury caused by denying refuge to a ship is bilateral, state to state. A ship's flag state would
have to take up its ship's cause. To date, none of the flag states have made any efforts to allege
that the coastal states involved violated their international obligations. Additionally, the
conditions that excuse state responsibility would arguably provide strong defenses to any state
in such a situation.
113 See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 Am. J.
INT'L L. 391,403 (1993).
114 See id. at 402-03.
115 Self-defense in international law evolved to deal with the paradigm of state-to-state
armed conflict. A state's right to take lawful actions under international law in self-defense is
thus normally analyzed in terms of military threat posed by another state. It is therefore
somewhat awkward conceptually to apply these concepts with regard to a distressed ship. This
awkwardness is manifest in at least three ways.
First, the threat is posed by a non-state actor (a ship). Secondly, the threat is nonmilitary in
nature. The aggrieved state is not confronting an imminent armed attack. Third, the aggrieved
state's response to this threat is non-military in nature. It is probably not going to destroy the
distressed ship. Rather, the aggrieved state is just trying to keep the distressed ship out of its
near-shore waters (although perhaps the threat of force is implied if the distressed ship does not
comply with the orders of the aggrieved coastal state). While it is possible to apply concepts of
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state's actions in self-defense must be both proportional to the threat and
necessary. 116 The necessity must be instant and overwhelming. 117
In this light, from one perspective, a distressed ship could argue that the
concept of self-defense in international law is applicable solely to conflicts
involving a use of force and not to the situation of a distressed ship seeking safe
harbor. 118 Yet, the Draft Articles on the Law of State Responsibility do not have
any specific limitations on the term self-defense. 119 Thus, it is plausible to read
the term self-defense broadly. 120 In this light, self-defense could be read to
include things such as keeping dangerous ships and cargoes away from coastal
populations and environmentally sensitive areas.121
This broader reading of self-defense dovetails with a concurrent narrow
reading of force majeure and distress. 122 If force majeure and distress are limited
by notions of fault and assumed risk, it makes sense to say that a state has some
claim to self-defense where a dangerous ship is seeking entry and that ship is at
self-defense in international law on a sliding scale, the language and rules of self-defense are
not so couched. They are couched in terms of taking great measures to protect a state from a
grave threat to the state's very existence.
The Caroline incident, the benchmark for the rules of self-defense under customary
international law, illustrates this point. Citing this case, international law practitioners and
scholars have consistently relied on terms such as self-preservation, necessity, instant, and
overwhelming in analyzing the right of states to take action in self-defense. This is in language
of dire, in extremis circumstances. This supports the idea that the concept of self-defense under
international law is steeped in terms of protecting a state from imminent armed attack. This
makes its application to the case of distressed shipping, while not implausible, at least
intellectually awkward.
The following excerpt is instructive in this regard and stresses the importance of the
Caroline incident. See Gardam, supra note 113, at 403:
[T]he incident that provided the basis of the most commonly accepted formulation of
proportionality in the pre-Charter system, that proposed by Webster in the Caroline
incident, was regarded by many writers as an example of self-preservation. The
formulation was as follows: "It will be for [the British Government, in this case] to show,
also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment...
did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-
defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it."
(citations omitted).
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International
Wrongful Acts, supra note 110, at 48.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 48-49.
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least partly responsible for the condition in which it finds itself.123 Thus, the
actions of coastal states in the Erika and Castor incidents could be understood to
fall within the concept of self-defense. 124
Implicit in the Erika and Castor incidents is the idea that coastal states should
not be forced to put themselves at risk by accepting allegedly substandard ships,
even if those ships are in distress. 125 For example, the Maltese government
apparently relied only on the rationale that its primary obligation was to protect its
own citizenry. 126 In this light, the actions of those states might not have been in
violation of international law.127
C. Arguments Against the Application of the Right of Entry
Next, five rationales suggest that the right of entry was not implicated in the
Erika and Castor incidents. First, perhaps modern search-and-rescue capabilities
of coastal states obviate the need to allow entry to distressed ships. 128 Second,
arguably states could prohibit entry to distressed ships as a proportional
countermeasure to the unlawful acts of other states. 129 A third argument is that the
need to protect the marine environment gives states the power to keep dangerous
vessels out of their territorial sea.130 A fourth argument is that a coastal state's
123 See id.
124 See Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International
Wrongful Acts, supra note 110, at 48-49.
125 There is obviously considerable domestic political pressure on states because "[t]he
tolerance ... of the general public for shipping incidents that merely threaten pollution has
evaporated." Point of View-Critical Issues Confronting Class, LLOYD'S LIST (London), Feb.
15, 2001, at 14. This pressure is compounded by the fact that sheltered waters are typically
found near popular resorts and marinas. See Andrew Spurrier, France Rina Hits Back at
Official Erika Disaster Report, LLOYD'S LIST (London), Dec. 19, 2000, at 3; Sandra Speares,
Malta Defends Decision to Deny Castor Safe Haven, LLOYD's LIST (London), June 7, 2001, at
3; Jean-Pierre Dobler, Areas of Refuge Must be Decided, LLOYD'S LIST (London), Jan. 22,
2001, at 5.
126 See Aline De Bievre, Tankers: Rust Sank the Erika Says Malta Report, LLOYD'S LIST
(London), Oct. 4, 2000, at 1.
127 See id.
128 See Focus on Ship Safety Not Ports of Refuge Says Spain, supra note 107.
129 See Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International
Wrongful Acts, supra note 110, at 123-33.
130 See Alan Boyle, Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 347, 370 (1985) (arguing that the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea placed
increased duties on coastal states to protect the environment). See generally Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment: Declaration on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 Corr. 1 (1973) (pronouncing that states should do all that is possible to protect
marine areas from hazardous substances).
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needs for border control and security' 3' heighten its interest and authority in
keeping all ships, including endangered ships, out of its territorial sea132 Lastly,
international shipping has changed so dramatically over the last fifty years, both
in terms of total tonnage and the actual size of the ships themselves, such that the
right of entry for reasons of force majeure or distress is an antiquated notion. 133
While none are dispositive and some of these rationales are in fact questionable,
taken together they perhaps add some quantum of legitimacy to the actions of
coastal states involved in the Erika and Castor incidents.
1. Modem Search-and-Rescue Capabilities
For instance, Spain argued that given modem search-and-rescue capabilities,
granting a distressed ship entry is no longer necessary. 134 Spain's theory was that
they could protect both the lives of the mariners and the sanctity of the
coastline. 135 Yet, the facts of both the Erika and Castor incidents suggest that the
search-and-rescue rationale might not comport with reality. 136 Indeed, the fact
131 See Stephen E. Flynn, America the Vulnerable, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 60,
70-74.
132 See id.
133 See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
134 See Focus on Ship Safety Not Ports of Refuge Says Spain, supra note 107:
But when a country maintains a search and rescue facility such as Salvamento
Maritimo Espanol, with its network of navigational control and essential facilities such as
rescue boats and helicopters, which enables us to save lives and, in many cases, ships and
cargoes, perhaps it is not so urgent for such countries to additionally offer ports of refuge,
particularly for ships in poor condition carrying dangerous cargoes.
135 See id Following the Castor incident, Spanish authorities justified their actions, in
part, on the idea that simply granting a ship in distress safe harbor was no longer necessary. See
id. The idea behind this argument is that a government has both an obligation to the crew of a
ship in distress and to its own citizens. See id. While granting safe harbor to a ship, consistent
with the right of entry, might be best for the crew, Spanish authorities argued that this ran
counter to the government's duty to protect its own citizens. See id. In the short term, Spanish
authorities argued that, given their modem search-and-rescue capabilities, pulling the
endangered crew off the ship while leaving the ship itself to the mercy of the seas, away from
the Spanish coast, was at that time the optimal way to balance the competing interests. See id.
136 Spain's assumption that contemporary search-and-rescue capabilities mitigate the need
for the right of entry is debatable. In the Erika incident, French coastguard and naval personnel
lacked the capability to rescue all of Erika's crew. See supra note 31. The storm-battered sailors
were saved, in part, by daring acts of heroism performed by the British Royal Navy using large
military helicopters. See supra notes 32-33. France, although a major military and maritime
power, was unable on its own to muster the resources to rescue Erika's crew. Id. If France
lacked adequate rescue capabilities, what does that suggest about the rest of the world's search-
and-rescue capabilities? How would Spain react if one of her naval vessels became disabled
due to heavy weather and was denied entry into sheltered waters near a country that lacked the
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that France, a modem military and maritime power, was unable to muster the
resources to rescue Erika's crew 137 suggests that Spain's theory is flawed. 138
2. Countermeasures
Next, states are permitted to take proportional countermeasures against other
states in response to unlawful acts.139 Thus, if State A had previously denied entry
capacity to rescue the Spanish sailors? States must always be mindful of the fact that the
positions they take today can easily create awkward situations for themselves in the future when
the shoe is on the other foot.
Furthermore, is it a good idea to bank on daring rescue and salvage operations in foul
weather and sea conditions as part of the rationale for abandoning or diluting the force majeure
defense to coastal state jurisdiction? Amazingly, no one was injured or killed in the rescue of
the Erika and Castor crews. See supra notes 31-33, 50-53. A skilled team of mariners was able
to offload Castor's cargo in a risky at-sea operation. See supra note 53. If this becomes the
norm, someone will get killed; it is just a matter of time. Search-and-rescue operations and
salvage-and-recover operations are inherently risky and unpredictable. In these operations:
[t]here are no hard and fast rules ... only what is considered the best practice by
experienced and capable seamen may be stated. So many elements control the application
of the general rules--such as sea, wind, urgency of immediate assistance, maneuverability
of the assisting ship, and the training and experience of the boat crews-that each case
must be decided according to the circumstances.
KNIGHT's MODERN SEAMANsIP § 11.17, at 324 (John V. Noel ed., 1989). The number of
factors that can be diminished or mitigated, such as severity of weather (by moving closer to
shore or getting a lee from the shore) and proximity to search-and-rescue facilities (also by
moving closer to shore), greatly increase the chances of success. See id. at 324-25. Indeed,
these practical realities of basic seamanship and rescue operations generally highlight the very
reasons that the force majeure doctrine became customary international law in the first place.
137 See supra note 31.
138 See id.
139 See Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International
Wrongful Acts, supra note 110, at 46-47, 48, 54, 56-57:
Chapter II1
Breach of an international obligation
Article 12
Existence of a breach of an international obligation
There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is
not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or
character.
Article 13
International obligation inforcefor a state
An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the
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State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.
Article 15
Breach consisting of a composite act
1. The breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of actions or
omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful, occurs when the action or omission occurs
which, taken with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful
act.
2. In such a case, the breach extends over the entire period starting with the first of the
actions or omissions of the series and lasts for as long as these actions or omissions are
repeated and remain not in conformity with the international obligation.
Chapter V
Circumstances precluding wrongfulness
Article 22
Countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international
obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a
countermeasure taken against the latter State in accordance with chapter 1I of Part Three.
Part Three
The Implementation of the International Responsibility of a State
Chapter I
Invocation of the responsibility of a State
Article 43
Notice of claim by an injured State
1. An injured State which invokes the responsibility of another State shall give notice
of its claim to that State.
Chapter II
Countermeasures
Article 49
Object and limits of countermeasures
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to a ship in distress from State B, State A would later have difficulty arguing that
one of its ships should be allowed entry into the waters of State B. State B's denial
in that hypothetical situation could be understood as a lawful and proportional
countermeasure. 140 State B's theory would be that State A's actions in denying
entry to State B's distressed vessel in the past was a breach of State A's
obligations under UNCLOS and therefore unlawful.1 41
In this light, a state involved in either the Erika or the Castor incident, such as
France, might have been able to justify its refusal to allow entry to either vessel
on the grounds that it was responding to the unlawful act of another state. 142
However, this is not the factual or legal situation that actually occurred.' 43
1. An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is
responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with
its obligations under Part Two.
2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of
intemational obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State.
3. Countermeasures shall, as far as practicable, be taken in such a way as to permit
the resumption of performance of the obligations in question.
Article 51
Proportionality
Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account
the gravity of the internationally wrongful acts and the rights in question.
Article 52
Conditions relating to resort to countermeasures
1. Before taking countermeasures, an injured State shall:
(a) Call on the responsible State, in accordance with article 43, to fulfill is
obligations under Part Two;
(b) Notify the responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures and
offer to negotiate with that State.
140 Typically though, a countermeasure would be preceded by some form of diplomatic
protest. State B would have objected to State A's refusal in the first instance. Then, when the
tables turned, State B's actions could be understood as a lawful countermeasure. Absent such
procedural history, State B's later denial of entry would arguably fall out of the rubric of lawful
countermeasures.
141 See supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
142 See id.
143 See supra notes 22-57 and accompanying text. France, when it denied entry to either
Erika or Castor, did not state, either formally or informally, that it was doing so in response to
maltreatment of one of its own vessels at the hands of either flag state. Indeed, there is no
indication that any of the flag states involved in the Erika or Castor incidents are themselves
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At some time in the recent past, a vessel flying France's flag would have had
to have been denied entry by the flag state of either the Erika or the Castor.144 In
response to this denial of entry, France would have had to do several things. First,
France would have had to give notice to either flag state that it considered their
actions an illegal act under international law. Second, France would have had to
give notice to those flag states that it intended to take proportional
countermeasures in response. Third, France would have needed to specify that as
one such countermeasure, it was going to respond in kind by denying entry into
French waters to distressed ships from those flag states.1 45 No such prior incident
occurred 146 and no such notice was given. Therefore, while at least theoretically
possible, neither the Erika nor the Castor incidents could be understood as lawful
and proportional countermeasures. 14 7
3. Protection of the Marine Environment
Over the past thirty years coastal states have increasingly had more control
over their territorial sea for the purpose of preventing pollution and protecting
coastal populations under international law.148 International law has generally
shifted away from what some decried as a "freedom to pollute" towards an
emphasis on the need to protect the marine environment. 149 This trend has
resulted in greater focus on flag state responsibility. It has also resulted in
increased port state control over coastal waters to prevent pollution.' 50 This shift
interested in pressing either incident as a violation of international law on the part of the coastal
states.
144 See generally Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
International Wrongful Acts, supra note 110, at 145.
145 See id.
146 See supra notes 22-57 and accompanying text.
147 See id.
148 See TREVES, supra note 79, at 61-62; Brian Reyes & Nigel Tutt, Tanker Plight of
Castor Prompts IMO Plea, LLOYD's LIST (London), Jan. 9, 2001, at 1; Agustfn Blanco-Bazgn,
IMO Interface With the Law of the Sea Convention, at http'/www.imo.org/InfoResource/
mainframe.asp?topic_id=406&docid= 1077 (Jan. 6, 2000).
149 Boyle, supra note 130, at 370.
150 The port state arguably has the greatest incentive to prevent maritime pollution caused
by shipping traffic in and out of its harbors. A flag state, on the other hand, in a race to the
bottom to attract business, might be lax in enforcement of international pollution regulations
and suffer no direct consequences. This dichotomy creates a tension in that the flag state has the
greatest amount of legal authority, as the sovereign, to regulate its vessels. Given this
dichotomy and the increasing importance of international environmental law, port states have
increasingly come to enjoy more of the bundle of sovereignty rights over shipping than was
once the case. The following material highlights this point:
Enforcement action for all sources of pollution will also for the first time be a duty for
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arguably further ameliorates a distressed ship's right of entry as a defense to
coastal state jurisdiction. Thus, the coastal state's power to prohibit the distressed
ship's passage is enhanced. 151
As an aside, the difficulty in weighing a distressed ship's right of entry versus
a coastal state's inherent right of self-defense perhaps stems in part from a lack of
progress in the development of additional international environmental regulatory
regimes. 152 To the extent that progress can be made in the arena of international
environmental law, states might either be better able or less likely to deal with
dangerous, disabled ships.153
states, while in respect of vessels, the flag state must share its traditional primacy in
enforcement matters with a more general concurrent port state jurisdiction and a wider
coastal state protective jurisdiction ....
A second important sense in which the legal regime of the Convention can be seen as
comprehensive is in its emphasis on protecting the marine environment as a whole. This
aspect appears most obviously ... in the requirement to take measures to prevent, reduce,
and control pollution of the marine environment and not merely the environment of other
states, in the extension of port state jurisdiction to cover high seas pollution offenses and in
the statement that "States are responsible for the fulfillment of their international
obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment."
Id. See generally Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, supra note 130
(pronouncing that states should do all that is possible to protect marine areas from hazardous
substances).
151 See Boyle, supra note 130, at 370-71.
152 See Sean D. Murphy, Prospective Liability Regimes for the Transboundary Movement
of Hazardous Wastes, 88 Am. J. INT'L L. 24, 74-75 (1994) (noting that although some
regulations have been successful, "too often the rhetoric at the conclusion of these agreements
has far surpassed their latter implementation").
153 Effective enforcement of international law is invariably difficult. A finding that a state
or one of its nationals violated international law (public or private) by no means guarantees that
the aggrieved party will receive an adequate remedy. A coastal state therefore has a strong
incentive to keep dangerous shipping away from its shores in the first place. A later finding that
a sunken vessel violated international environmental law would be of little solace to a coastal
community cleaning up a major oil spill. It would be of even less value if that vessel had
inadequate insurance and the coastal state could not be reimbursed for the recovery costs. The
following material supports this idea:
The international community has adopted more than 170 environmental multilateral
agreements covering atmospheric, marine and land pollution, protection of wildlife and
preservation of shared global resources. More than two-thirds of these agreements were
reached since the early 1970s, when the international environmental movement came of
age. While some have been remarkably successful even in their early stages, too often the
rhetoric at the conclusion of these agreements has far surpassed their later implementation.
For this reason, international lawyers and policy makers must pursue means of increasing
the effectiveness of international environmental agreements, whether through enhanced
monitoring and verification, more systematic funding, better use of international
institutions, or the creation of supplementary regimes such as those relating to liability and
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4. Border Security
Furthermore, the recent tragedy of September 11, 2001 arguably only furthers
this need for a coastal state to exercise greater authority over its territorial sea. 154
All coastal states are now more cognizant over their legitimate need for border
control in order to prevent devastating terrorist acts from taking place on their
soil. 155 Controlling which ships enter their territorial sea is therefore part of that
legitimate need and interest.156 This interest would seem on balance to heighten a
coastal state's right to refuse a vessel's entry into the territorial sea.157 Arguably,
because a distressed ship would not actually have to dock in the coastal state
ameliorates its concern for border security.158 On balance, though, self-defense
compensation. Just as the regimes created by these agreements are addressed to the
underlying environmental problem, so should be any liability and compensation regime.
Recent regulatory controls on the transboundary movement of hazardous substances
are now under review. The economic importance of the trade, whether for disposal or
recycling, together with the dangers from its mismanagement, makes it incumbent upon
states, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to ensure that any
proposed liability regime reinforces the standards set in regulatory instruments, the most
significant of which is the Basel Convention. Moreover, the liability regime should not
undermine these standards by creating incentives for private actors to operate outside the
system for fear of extensive claims for damages.
Id (footnote omitted).
154 See Flynn, supra note 131, at 60 (viewing the September 11, 2001 tragedy as forcing
the United States to protect its vulnerable ports).
155 See id. at 62-63.
156 See id. at 69-73.
157 The attacks of September 11,2001 have highlighted the vulnerability of seaports:
The United States is trying to plug potentially disastrous security gaps in the nation's
seaports ....
The relaxed policies around U.S. ports ... make it possible for terrorists to retrieve
illicit arms and explosives undetected-or even to hijack ships.
"A terrorist act involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons at
one of these seaports could result in extensive loss of lives, property, and business, affect
the operations of harbors and the transportation infrastructure, including bridges, railroads
and highways, and cause extensive environmental damage"....
... [Slecurity specialists warn there's nothing to stop attackers from shipping a
"weaponized container" directly at almost any targeted U.S. metropolitan area.
August Gribbins, Seaports Seen as Terrorism Target; U.S. Will Secure Harbors, but Actions
Likely to Hurt Trade, WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 22,2002, at Al.
158 Yet given the high profile nature of force majeure incidents, it seems unlikely, on
1490 [Vol. 63:1465
ANY PORTIN A STORM?
concerns for coastal states in light of September 11, 2001 are heightened, and this
perhaps detracts from a distressed ship's right of entry. 159
5. Changing Conditions-The Impact of Supertankers
Next, another rationale offered by coastal states is that force majeure is
perhaps an outdated notion, given the great increase in the size and scope of
international shipping. 160 International shipping has changed so dramatically in
the last fifty years that simply forcing coastal states to accept any vessel in distress
is no longer viable. 16 1
Weighing against this argument, though, is the fact that the acceptance of the
right of entry and the doctrine of force majeure into UNCLOS happened without
protest or debate. 162 Also, it is generally accepted under international law that
balance, that a ship could somehow abuse the right of entry in order to smuggle in terrorists or
weapons of mass destruction. As witnessed in the Castor and Erika incidents, those ships were
under tremendous scrutiny from coastal military and civilian authorities and the international
media. See supra notes 22-50 and accompanying text. Given this level of scrutiny, the concerns
raised by the tragedies of September 11, 2001, although of the most serious weight, are
probably not altered significantly by the right of entry. Additionally, a distressed ship's right of
entry merely excuses it from coastal state jurisdiction while in the territorial sea. It does not
grant that ship a right actually to dock in the coastal state.
159 On balance, legitimate port and border security concerns do undoubtedly add some
quantum of legitimacy to the argument that coastal states should have greater control over the
territorial sea, as a general matter. This heightened need and power, although arguably
inapplicable in a right-of-entry case, does further cloud the issue over the right of entry, when
added to the coastal state's legitimate environmental and safety concerns. As Stephen E. Flynn,
a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, highlights, all border control concerns are
interrelated. See Flynn, supra note 130, at 60. The key security issue for states is achieving
transparency over borders. See id at 74. Many states argue that increasing their authority and
capability in one arena, such as counter-narcotics, necessarily has the effect of a virtuous cycle
when combating other ills related to border security, such as terrorists. See id. at 69-73.
160 See A Refuige-Between a Rock and a Hard Place, LLOYD'S LIST (London), Feb. 14,
2001, at 7:
It was one thing to cope with a tweendecker full of pit-props and a thirty-degree list, or an
ore carrier with the cargo shifted. But at some time during the 1960s, when, in an
astonishing extrapolation of ship sizes, a "supertanker" grew from 50,000 dwt to five times
that tonnage in about that many years, a ship in distress became a most unwelcome guest.
161 See id. at 7.
162 UNCLOS went into effect in 1994. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 84. All of the states involved that ratified UNCLOS did so within the past
twenty years. See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the
Convention and Related Agreements as of 12 November 2001, supra note 85. If conditions had
changed in such a dramatic way as to require a change to the right of entry and the doctrine of
force majeure, an ancient and long-standing principle of customary international law, then
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changing conditions alone do not excuse a state from meeting its international
obligations.163 Thus, even if there had been a sudden change in the condition of
international shipping, this change alone would not have excused coastal states
from their international obligations. Moreover, it is doubtftl that there was a
sudden change in international shipping. By the time UNCLOS was adopted,
ships were already large and getting larger. The volume of international trade was
already high and getting higher.164 Thus, examining solely the changing
condition's rationale, for a state's actions not to constitute violations of
international law, the law would first have to be changed.165 A change to the law
is exactly what is under consideration by the IMO. 16 6
surely the issue would have been debated. No such debates are on record. See supra note 79.
The force majeure clause was accepted without protest. See id.
16 3 Customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set a
high bar for excusing a state from its voluntarily undertaken international obligations. A state
cannot merely argue that something has changed. The change must be drastic and unforeseen.
The following text supports this idea:
[C]hanged circumstances "must be" of such a nature, either individually or collectively,
that their effect would radically transform the extent of obligations .... A fundamental
change of circumstances must have been unforeseen; the existence of the circumstance at
the time of the Treaty's conclusion must have constituted an essential basis of the consent
of the parties to be bound by the Treaty.
Hungary/Slovakia, 1997 I.C.J. 3, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS 162, 195 (1998). Granted,
foreseeability tests can be difficult to apply. Logically, events cannot be easily categorized into
either completely foreseeable or completely unforeseeable. In the real world, events are perhaps
either more foreseeable or less foreseeable. Where a given event or set of circumstances falls on
this scale can always be debated.
Even so, the increase in the size and scope of international shipping falls into the more
foreseeable category. Ships have been getting longer and drawing more water for time
immemorial. Coastal states have been consistently and aggressively pursuing dredging projects
to accommodate vessels of deeper and deeper drafts in order to attract the accompanying
international trade. A state could not argue, in an intellectually honest way, that it became a
party to UNCLOS and dredged its harbors to deeper drafts and yet did somehow not
contemplate that shipping was going to get larger. The changed circumstance argument
therefore fails.
164 See id.
165 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, S. Treaty Doc. No. 92-1; Richard Morrison, Efficient Breach of International Agreements,
23 DENV. J. IrT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 213-17 (1994) (positing that a fundamental change in
circumstances is an excuse in the most limited of circumstances).
16 6 See IMO Safety Talks to be Held in Secret, LLOYD'S LIST (London), Mar. 5, 2001, at 7;
"Places of Refuge "-A Priority Issuefor IMO, supra note 9.
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IV. PRE-DESIGNATED PLACES OF REFUGE
The Erika and Castor incidents demonstrate that, not surprisingly, the rights
of coastal states are largely winning out over the rights of distressed vessels. 167
Unfortunately, the Erika incident in particular demonstrates that this tension can
result in a worst-case scenario in the real world where no one wins--the ship can
be destroyed resulting in a disastrous oil spill for the coastal state and great peril
for the mariners. 168 Recognizing that keeping dangerous and disabled ships at sea
is not in anyone's interest, the IMO is correctly seeking to prevent future Erikas
and Castors.169
Specifically, the IMO is considering adoption of a regime of pre-designated
places of refuge. 170 The basic idea is that coastal states would have at least one
area where vessels in distress could seek shelter. 171 While the events of
September 11, 2001, naturally motivated the IMO to focus heavily on the
importance of maritime, transport, and port security, the IMO continues to work
on voluntary guidelines for places of refuge. 72 In the final analysis, the IMO's
plan, while well-intended, is not well-suited to meet its objective. A major cause
of incidents like the Erika and the Castor is arguably substandard shipping. 173 In
167 See supra notes 22-57 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
169 TheIMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations. See Introduction to the IMO,
at http://www.imo.org/HOME.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2002). It was established by the IMO
Convention "which entered into force in 1958." Id. The IMO has 162 Member States. See id.
The IMO's purpose is to:
"[Pirovide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping
engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the
highest practicable standards in matters concerning the maritime safety, efficiency of
navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships."
Id. (quoting Article l(a) of the IMO Convention). In short, the IMO focuses on safe shipping
and pollution prevention. See id The IMO has adopted over forty conventions related to these
issues. See id The IMO also focuses on pressuring and assisting governments to adopt
implementing legislation of the IMO conventions. See id
170 See generally "Places of Refuge "-A Priority Issue for IMO, supra note 9.
171 See id.
172 See Lowry et al., supra note 10.
173 Subsequent investigation of the Erika and Castor incidents suggests that both ships
may have suffered from a form of "super-rest." See 'Super-rust' Threat, supra note 55. This
"potent new form of corrosion... could threaten a whole generation of ageing products tankers,
and possibly also newer hulled vessels." Id. Consequently, many in the international shipping
industry believe that steps must be taken quickly by the private sector to deal with this threat.
Id.; see also Andrew Spurrier, An Inspector at St. Malo Set Alarm Bells Ringing About
Corrosion on the Andina Trader, LLOYD'S LIST (London), Mar. 17, 2001, at 4 (discussing a
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the short term, adopting pre-designated places of refuge will have the effect of
keeping substandard shipping in distress at sea longer. 174 It will also further erode
the right of entry.175 Neither of these will measurably improve the quality of
international shipping. 176
In the alternative, the IMO should continue to focus on doing what it does
best--raising international shipping standards and encouraging flag state
responsibility. 177 At the same time, the right of entry for vessels in distress should
be preserved. Incidents like the Erika and the Castor should be dealt with on a
case by case basis. Rather than forcing all disabled vessels, no matter what their
particular circumstances, to transit to a pre-designated place of refuge, a case by
case approach would allow coastal authorities and professional mariners to work
together to make the best of a bad situation--preserving life and property at sea,
while protecting coastal areas and coastal populations.178
controversial inspection and subsequent detention of the Andina); A10 Safety Talks to be Held
in Secret, supra note 166 (listing various ideas to improve the monitoring of fleet conditions); A
Refuge-Between a Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 160 (detailing the lax practices of
modem shipping); Anave Urges Concerted Approach to Safety Issues, LLOYD'S LIST (London),
June 14, 2001, at 14 (documenting a movement to enforce shipping quality in Spain); Sandra
Speares, Malta Defends Decision to Deny Castor Safe Haven, supra note 125 (describing the
risks ports take in allowing entry of an injured vessel).
174 A simple hypothetical situation illustrates this point. Suppose a Canadian fuel tanker
was transiting from Sarnia, Ontario (north of Detroit, Michigan on the St. Claire river) to
Toledo, Ohio on the Great Lakes. Suppose that the United States, in response to the IMO's
places of refuge initiative, had pre-designated Buffalo, New York, at the eastern edge of Lake
Erie, as its place of refuge for Lake Erie. Then suppose that this Canadian fuel taker became
disabled at the western end of Lake Erie, perhaps near Monroe, Michigan.
The pre-designated refuge plan would force this ship to attempt to travel more than 200
miles across the entire lake. In the interim, the ship could sink, its crew could be killed, or it
could run aground, spilling its cargo along the shores of Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, or New
York. A pre-designated refuge plan fails to account for this basic geographic problem. We do
not get to choose when and where emergencies happen. A flexible, case by case approach, is
necessary to protect lives and the environment.
175 See A Refuge-Between a Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 160; Hughes, Issue of
Scrapping Hazardous Ships Becoming More Pressing, supra note 55.
176 "Although many tank owners flinch at the prospect of new regulations and more
stringent surveys, leading classification societies are already forming the view that more has to
be done." 'Super-rust' Threat, supra note 55.
177 See Introduction to the IMO, supra note 169.
178 See KNIGHT'S MODERN SEAMANSHIP, supra note 136, § 11.12, at 324-25.
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A. IMO's Plan-Pre-designated Places of Refuge
The proposition being taken up by Committees of the IMO is that coastal
states would pre-designate various areas as places of refuge. 179 Instead of
distressed vessels being permitted to seek "any port in a storm," they would be
forced to transit to a coastal state's pre-designated place of refuge. 180 Many fear
that action is needed so that the treatment of the Castor does not become a model
for coastal states to follow in the future when confronted with a request for shelter
by a ship in distress. 18 1
B. Obstacles to Adopting Pre-designated Places of Refuge
However, a change in the law towards pre-designated places of refuge raises
two significant problems. First, it is probably beyond the IMO's power to alter
coastal states' obligations under UNCLOS. 182 UNCLOS itself would have to be
amended.' 8 3 Second, as a policy matter, adopting a rigid regime that forces
disabled ships to transit to a pre-designated place of refuge is not sound. The right
of entry for a disabled vessel should be preserved and incidents like the Erika and
Castor should be dealt with, albeit more effectively, on a case by case basis.
First, any consensus IMO reached on places of refuge would not, in and of
179 "A spokesman for the European Commission said: 'This situation clearly shows the
need for our post-Erika proposals to oblige members to nominate ports of refuge."'
Mediterranean Crew Threat to Abandon Stricken Tanker Castor, LLOYD's LIST (London), Jan.
6, 2001, at 3.
180 "All the parties involved in this incident are fearful that the political treatment of the
Castor may become a precedent for future casualties and believe it is imperative that sensible,
risk based guidelines on sheltered areas be developed at an intergovernmental level within
IMO." Safety-Saving the Castor, supra note 2; see also Places of Refuge-Reaction to the
Castor, IMO Maritime Safety Committee, 74th Sess., at http://www.imo.org/Newsroon/
mainframe.asp?topic id=ll0&docid=l151 (May 8-June 2001) (noting that the Maritime
Safety Committee, over the next two years, will develop guidelines covering "action expected
from costal states providing 'places of refuge' to ships in distress"); Dobler, supra note 125:
However, it may still prove possible to find some less developed coastlines where it
will be possible to consider that a small number of residents can be evacuated in case of a
risky cargo transfer operation, the cost of such evacuation and that of possible damages
being taken in charge by the disabled ship's P&I club.
The IMO Marine Safety Committee may consider to undertake such a study in order
to determine a list of suitable sites.
181 See Dobler, supra note 125; "Places of Refuge"-A Priority Issue for IMO, supra
note 9.
182 See Blanco-BazAn, supra note 148.
183 See id.
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itself, modify Articles 17 and 18 of UNCLOS. 184 This raises a thorny issue of
treaty interpretation. The language of UNCLOS discussed above suggests that
prohibiting a vessel in distress from seeking shelter is simply a power that coastal
states do not have.' 85 An agreement under the auspices of the IMO granting
coastal states the power to require vessels only to enter pre-designated places of
refuge is not harmonious with this concept.186 It would perhaps violate the rule
that IMO regulations must conform to UNCLOS since UNCLOS is now a treaty
in force and acts as a "Constitution of the oceans. '"187
Beyond the potential ultra vires issue, there is a practical issue as to whether
the IMO could adopt a meaningful pre-designated places of refuge regime any
time in the near future.' 88 IMO prides itself as an international body capable of
acting quickly.189 It touts its tacit acceptance procedure as a quick and innovative
way of promulgating new international maritime standards. 190 To the IMO's
credit, it has been capable of rapidly adopting new shipping standards.' 91
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 Blanco-Bazdn, supra note 148. "The last important element of the story was added
when UNCLOS moved from its customary law status to that of a treaty in force. Entry into
force of UNCLOS meant that IMO instruments, rather than simply taking into account
UNCLOS, had to conform with its regulations." Id
188 See David Hughes, IMO Backs "Places of Refuge" Concept, Bus. TuMEs (Singapore),
June 19, 2001, at 2 (suggesting that many countries and ship masters will ignore overly
restrictive rules).
189 See IMO'S 50th Anniversary-A Record of Success, at http://www.imo.org/About
mainframe.asp?topicjid=321 (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (listing various examples of rapid
responses by the IMO).
190 Adopting detailed and meaningful administrative regulations at the domestic level can
be an enormously difficult task. Such an undertaking at the international level is necessarily
even more difficult and complicated. The IMO has been at the forefront of international dispute
resolution by experimenting with consensus and tacit acceptance techniques. Rather than seek a
unanimous up or down vote on every new proposal, the IMO has tried to use a consensus
approach where states must expressly reject new regulations. Interim regulations take effect
and, after a time, become permanent. While creating interim regulations in the first place can
pose formidable technical and legal challenges, subject to intense negotiations, the IMO has
used creative techniques to speed their implementation. The following passage justly credits the
IMO for its innovation:
IMO adopted a new amendment system known as tacit acceptance. Instead of an
amendment entering into force only after being positively accepted by a specified number
of Parties, it was assumed that the amendment would automatically enter into force on an
agreed date unless it was positively rejected by a specified number of Parties. Because of
the consensus approach used by IMO when adopting measures this system was approved
and has now been incorporated into nearly all of IMO's technical instruments ....
The time taken to bring SOLAS amendments into force under tacit acceptance has been
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However, IMO is not without its critics. 19 2 Some suggest that any new IMO
plan in this arena would be a "burden on the industry and ignored by ports and
coastal states." 19 3 Additionally, even if there are pre-designated places of refuge,
it is likely that in egregious situations, such as where a large tanker carrying fuel
is badly damaged and might explode or leak, the same domestic political concerns
that motivate states to disregard the distressed ship's right of entry will cause
states to avoid their obligations. 194 Coastal states are apparently flouting the law
now without consequence. 19 5 How would adopting a new, watered down regime
change that fundamental problem?196
Thus, the problem really might not be solved. Pariah ships like the Erika and
the Castor would, in distress, continue to be without a home, both endangering
their crews and increasing the likelihood that such ships would be destroyed at sea
and possibly spill their dangerous cargo into the seas, damaging the environment
and the coastline of coastal states, such as the Erika did to France. 197 Thus, the
steadily reduced until now urgent measures can be adopted and in force within 18
months---and they will apply to more than 98% of world tonnage.
Id.
191 See id.
192 See Hughes, supra note 188.
193 Id. Critics fear that the IMO's plan will place new restrictions on shipping without
producing the promised benefit--namely, having at least one place in each coastal state where
distressed ships could seek refuge. This attitude grows out of the general problem frequently
faced by both states and their nationals, that of obtaining an adequate remedy for violations of
international law, public and private. See id.
194 Brian Reyes, Castor O'Neil Pledge on Ports of Refuge, LLOYD'S LIST (London), Jan.
25, 2001, at 1.
195 See supra notes 84-106 and accompanying text.
196 See id.
197 As a policy matter, simply forcing substandard ships out to sea is not a good idea.
Obviously, the coastal state runs the risk that the ship will break apart in an uncontrolled
manner. The Erika incident itself aptly illustrates this risk. See supra notes 22-39. Given that
"[c]arrying out... cargo transfer[s] in protected waters would dramatically increase the chances
of success," are coastal states really better off if pariah ships are left to the mercy of the seas?
Brian Reyes, Castor Spain Presses for Haven Debate, LLOYD's LIST (London), Jan. 16, 2001,
at 3. This argument, in a sense, is a kind of Russian roulette. Maybe the ship will not break
apart, in which case the gamble will have paid off. Or, if it does break apart, maybe it will
happen along another state's coast. But maybe, depending on the circumstances, the coastal
state will end up with an Erika, in which case the coastal state will pay a heavy price, arguably a
much heavier price than that state would have paid had an incident occurred in port, under more
controlled conditions. See Montreal-IMO Shipping Safety Culture Applies to Ports Says
O'Neil, supra note 11. Furthermore, the threat posed by an in-port incident is perhaps overrated:
Many of the coastal states that denied the Castor access to their territorial waters did
so from a belief that the vessel posed an unacceptable hazard, either from explosion or
cargo spill ....
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effectiveness of places of refuge, even if adopted, is questionable. 198 In this light,
going through a potentially lengthy process to change the law might not be
effective. 199
Furthermore, any action by the IMO on ports of refuge in the near future
would likely not be in the form of mandatory obligations on the part of coastal
states. 200 In fact, the IMO is currently working on non-mandatory guidelines.2°'
The states that are now urging that the law be changed to having pre-designated
places of refuge are themselves arguing that such a scheme be optional.202 Also,
at the end of the process, there could still be the problem of states ultimately
deciding that, under substantial domestic political pressure, they are not going to
shoulder their international burdens. 203 Simply put, they could still end up
keeping the Erikas and the Castors out of their waters, despite whatever pre-
designated places of refuge regime to which they agree.
Next, even if states are able to shift to a system of pre-designated places of
. .. [I]ndependent scientific analysis of both scenarios clearly showed that the risk of
an explosion was minimal and that the potential pollution threat was far worse if the vessel
was to sink in deep water.
Safety--Saving the Castor, supra note 2. Additionally, as discussed above, the great risk to the
lives of the distressed vessel's crew is similarly another obvious counter-argument.
Furthermore, even if a coastal state could justifiably keep substandard ships in distress out
of its territorial sea, it raises the thorny issue of what constitutes a substandard ship. Erika had a
significant rust problem, yet it was inspected in Sicily and was authorized to operate until its re-
inspection in January 2000. Montgomery & Bell, supra note 22. Castor was considered to be in
excellent condition. See id. The issue of what constitutes a substandard ship is beyond the scope
of this note. However, given that both the Erika and Castor were fully and validly certified for
service at sea under international maritime standards, it is doubtful that even if there were a
substandard ship exception to a distressed ship's right of entry for reasons of force majeure or
distress, that either ship would have fallen into that category. But see Spurrier, supra note 125.
Additionally, arguing over whether a duly certified ship is substandard in an emergency
situation only delays needed action. Ships in the Erika's and the Castor's respective situations
need shelter and assistance. Forcing them to sea while coastal authorities debate certification
issues puts both mariners and coastal populations at risk.
198 See Global Authority Should Rule on 'Leper' Ships, LLOYD'S LIST (London), Sept. 20,
2001, at 5 (urging that "a new international authority should be appointed with powers to
overrule individual governments seeking to shun ships that become 'maritime lepers"').
199 See id.
200 "We're not starting from the point of view of a mandatory regime to say to countries,
'you must do this."' Reyes, supra note 194 (quoting IMO Secretary General William O'Neil).
201 See Lowry et al., supra note 10.
202 "[R]eflecting the position of the governments that have to date refused shelter to the
disabled vessel... [p]orts of refuge cannot be imposed on governments or states." Reyes, supra
note 197.
203 See supra notes 84-106 and accompanying text.
1498 [Vol. 63:1465
ANY PORTINA STORM?
refuge someday, this in turn raises an equitable issue of environmental justice.204
Indeed, any pre-designated places of refuge are likely, as a matter of political
power and influence, to be poorer areas. Should poorer people be more likely to
suffer the consequences of an environmental disaster than others?2 05 The logical
consequence of shifting to pre-designated places of refuge might create such a
result as a matter of systemic design.206 Thus, this issue should be openly debated
as part of the consideration of pre-designated places of refuge and ultimately
weigh against shifting to such a system.207
Additionally, coastal states have an overlapping obligation to protect the
marine environment.208 Heightening the risk of major oil spills by forcing the
distressed vessel to limp to a pre-designated place of refuge 20 9 is inconsistent with
this duty to protect the marine environment. 210
Besides, is abandoning a distressed vessel's right of entry in favor of pre-
designated places of refuge a good policy choice? Many argue that the intent of
coastal authorities in both the Erika and Castor incidents was simply to push the
disabled vessels offshore and thus push the consequences of any problems
away.211 As discussed above, such a policy clearly endangers the lives of
mariners. 212 Further, as discussed above, it puts coastal states at heightened risk
of having hazardous cargoes spilled on their shores. 213 Lastly, it does not directly
204 See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 'Environmental Justice': The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 790 (1992)
(explaining how fairness and minority interests conflate with changing environmental policy).
205 In the domestic context, many argue that interest group politics results in
environmental regulation that pushes pollution sources closer to "racial minority communities
and low income neighborhoods." See Lazarus, supra note 204, at 849. Similarly, in the
international context, it is plausible to believe that similar interest group pressures might
normally and naturally motivate states to have their pre-designated place of refuge near poorer
areas with limited political clout. This issue should therefore be openly debated and considered
by the IMO in debating the wisdom of a pre-designated places of refuge system.
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 See Jon M. Van Dyke, Sharing Ocean Resources in a Time of Scarcity and
Selfishness, in LAW OF THE SEA: THE COMMON HERITAGE AND EMERGING CHALLENGES, supra
note 79, at 3, 26; see also Dobler, supra note 125 ("[Alny ship casualty is a menace for the
marine environment.").
209 See IMO Safety Talks to be Held in Secret, supra note 166; "Places of Refuge "-A
Priority Issue for IMO, supra note 9.
210 See Van Dyke, supra note 208, at 26.
211 See Wills, supra note 39.
212 See supra note 52.
213 See supra note 34.
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address what most believe causes these incidents in the first place-substandard
shipping. 214
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Rather than put so much to chance, such as the risk of having a tanker break
apart off the coast or having mariners killed at sea, there is another way. The
Castor incident demonstrated the skill and ingenuity of the international
professional maritime community, the dedication and expertise of classification
societies, and the responsiveness, preparedness, and daring of emergency search-
and-rescue personnel.215 Rather than letting the clock tick on these disasters and
letting bad situations get worse, an optimal solution simply would have been both
to act sooner and to bring an international private and public team together
quickly in emergency situations to minimize and mitigate the consequences of
Erika and Castor situations.
For example, when a ship in distress seeks refuge consistent with its right of
entry, the coastal state should grant that ship's request. The ship should be
permitted not necessarily to dock, but rather to seek shelter in the nearest available
area.216 Simultaneously, the ship owners, the relevant classification society, ship
yard repair personnel, and salvage crews should be activated and mobilized.217
The coastal state's rescue personnel should be standing by, focused on mitigating
the environmental consequences of the damaged vessel. This is the more logical
approach. It is better for these people to be working together in a much faster time
period and in a much safer environment.218
In contrast, letting the clock tick on situations like the Erika and the Castor
unnecessarily invites disaster. Commercial mariners, corporations, classification
societies, and government officials, including search-and-rescue personnel, all
ultimately end up getting involved and playing a role in these situations, as
2 14 See 'Super-rust' Threat, supra note 55 (citing evidence of new types of corrosion in
shipping vessels); Spurrier, supra note 173 (discussing a controversial inspection and detaining
of the Andina); IMO Safety Talks to be Held in Secret, supra note 166 (listing various ideas to
improve monitoring of fleet conditions); A Refuge-Between a Rock and a Hard Place, supra
note 160 (detailing the lax practices within modem shipping); Anave Urges Concerted
Approach to Safety Issues, supra note 173 (documenting a movement to enforce shipping
quality in Spain); Speares, supra note 125 (describing the risks ports take in allowing entry of
an injured vessel).
215 See supra note 52.
216 See Montreal-IMO Shipping Safety Culture Also Applies to Ports Says O'Neil, supra
note 11 (explaining that allowing entry into a port may not be necessary to help an injured
vessel).
217 See 'Super-rust' Threat, supra note 55.
218 See KNIGHT's MODERN SEAMANsHIP, supra note 136, § 11.17, at 324-25 (outlining
general guidelines for crew rescue).
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highlighted by recent events. But under the Erika and Castor models, they end up
having to do so under the worst of circumstances-having to offload personnel219
and hazardous cargo220 from heaving decks on disabled ships hundreds of miles
from shore while simultaneously bracing coastal communities for potential
environmental catastrophe.
Given that all of the major players are necessarily involved in response, it is
both in their mutual interest and logical to cooperate on prevention. Under a
cooperative approach that recognizes both the right of entry for reason of force
majeure and distress and the rights of coastal states, the relevant private and
public entities could be brought to bear in a safer and more timely, effective
221 ~ teway. When the next Castor comes along, rather than roll the dice, point fingers,
and force her back to sea, the relevant coastal states should spring into action to
stabilize the situation-and the classification society, shipping company, regional
governments, and other major players should get on board promptly to get the
situation under control.222
Coastal states themselves would be safer and less likely to have an Erika.22 3
Maritime crews would be safer. It is a possible win-win situation. The IMO
should resist the temptation to backpedal and rationalize by changing the rules of
the game and pinning hopes on luck and daring.224 Rather, the IMO should
encourage member states to meet their obligations while partnering with industry
and classification societies and rescue personnel to protect life and property at sea
and ashore.225
The technical and legal infrastructures are largely in place for coastal states
and professional mariners to operate in this cooperative manner.226 In fact, when
219 See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
221 See Global Authority Should Rule on 'Leper' Ships, supra note 198. Some urge the
creation of an independent organization-
[lied by non-political, independent professionals [which] ... would be backed by a
system in which vessels would be forced to take out insurance against pollution damage,
wreck removal costs, and explosions. While the dilemma has been highlighted by the
notorious Castor emergency ... it was stressed that was just one of many cases. As the
conference met, South African salvor Smit Pentow was battling to find a refuge for the
flooded 9,300 gt Liberian cargoship Bismihita'la, denied access to Cape Town and ports as
far away as Namibia.
Id.
222 See id.
223 See supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
224 See KNIGHT'S MODERN SEAMANSHIP, supra note 136, § 11.17, at 324 ("There are no
hard and fast rules for rescuing the crew of a wreck.").
225 See Bray, supra note 57.
226 See Introduction to the IMO, supra note 169; see also Paul Stephen Dempsey,
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a ship is in distress, cooperation across jurisdictional lines, both public and
private, domestic and international, is the norm.227 Under the 1974 International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ("SOLAS"), which now covers in excess
of ninety-eight percent of the world's commercial shipping, coastal states are
required to, and do, maintain search-and-rescue capabilities.228 In addition,
Compliance and Enforcement in International Law-Oil Pollution of the Marine Environment
by Ocean Vessels, 6 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 459, 558-60 (1984) (analyzing two multi-lateral
environmental conventions which aim to deter pollution); Franz Xaver Perrez, The Efficiency of
Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 515, 579
(1998) (noting that "states are increasingly willing to [cooperate] as the interdependencies
grow").
227 See Introduction to the IMO, supra note 169. The practices of mariners and coastal
states in dealing with distressed vessels evolved from humankind's best instinct--the impulse
to help those in need. In modem times, states have adopted formal legal and technical regimes
to fulfill this ideal and to help distressed mariners in systematic ways. The following material
fleshes out this point:
In the 1970s a global search and rescue system was initiated. The 1970s also saw the
establishment of the International Mobile Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), which has
greatly improved the provision of radio and other messages to ships.
In 1992 a further advance was made when the Global Maritime Distress and Safety
System began to be phased in. In February 1999, the GMDSS became fully operational, so
that now a ship that is in distress anywhere in the world can be virtually guaranteed
assistance, even if the ship's crew do not have time to radio for help, as the message will
be transmitted automatically.
Id.
228 See IMO and the Safety of Navigation, at http://www.imo.org/home.asp (last visited
Oct. 25, 2002); see also International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Nov.
1, 1974, at http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topicid=257&docjid=647#3 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2002):
Technical provisions
The main objective of the SOLAS Convention is to specify minimum standards for
the construction, equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their safety. Flag
States are responsible for ensuring that ships under their flag comply with its requirements,
and a number of certificates are prescribed in the Convention as proof that this has been
done. Control provisions also allow Contracting Governments to inspect ships of other
Contracting States if there are clear grounds for believing that the ship and its equipment
do not substantially comply with the requirements of the Convention-this procedure is
known as port State control. The current SOLAS Convention includes Articles setting out
general obligations, amendment procedure and so on, followed by an Annex divided into
12 Chapters.
Chapter I-General Provisions
Includes regulations concerning the survey of the various types of ships and the
issuing of documents signifying that the ship meets the requirements of the Convention.
The Chapter also includes provisions for the control of ships in ports of other Contracting
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pursuant to the IMO's 1994 amendment of SOLAS, coastal states have the power
to implement mandatory reporting systems for ships, which are useful in
expediting emergency operations.229 Such mandatory reporting schemes are in
effect in Europe.230
Looking to the future, the outlook for coordination technologies continues to
improve dramatically. The IMO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation has
adopted standards for the use of automatic ship reporting systems. 231 Using the
Global Positioning System, shipboard transponders, and electronic charting
systems, the technology exists for a ship's exact position and movements through
a sensitive area to be automatically reported and tracked by coastal authorities. On
the Great Lakes, for example, the United States and Canada are on the verge of
implementing such a system, known as the Automated Identification System
("AIS"). 232 In an emergency, such a system takes the search out of search-and-
Governments.
Chapter V-Safety of Navigation
Chapter V identifies certain navigation safety services which should be provided by
Contracting Governments and sets forth provisions of an operational nature applicable in
general to all ships on all voyages. This is in contrast to the Convention as a whole, which
only applies to certain classes of ship engaged on international voyages.
The subjects covered include the maintenance of meteorological services for ships;
the ice patrol service; routeing [sic] of ships; and the maintenance of search and rescue
services.
This Chapter also includes a general obligation for masters to proceed to the
assistance of those in distress and for Contracting Governments to ensure that all ships
shall be sufficiently and efficiently manned from a safety point of view.
A new revised chapter V was adopted in December 2000, entering into force on I
July 2002, The new chapter makes mandatory the carriage of voyage data recorders
(VDRs) and automatic ship identification systems (AIS)for certain ships.
Id. (emphasis added).
229 See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), supra note 228, at
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topicjid=257&docid-647#31.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See Kavanaugh, supra note 12. "Rear Admiral James Hull, Ninth District commander,
said that by this summer most ships entering the St. Lawrence Seaway will be equipped with an
electronic program called Automatic Identification System. This will allow ports and ships to
identify the exact location of all vessels on the water." Id. AIS integrates global positioning
data, electronic navigational charts, shipboard transponders, and shore-based command and
control facilities. See Ross, supra note 12. They provide Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) with
real-time information regarding the position and movement of commercial ships within their
area of operation. See id. This same information is available to all other ships transiting in a
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rescue.233 Coupled with modem communication technologies, other merchant
ships transiting the area are also well poised to assist, as is their obligation under
SOLAS. 234 Given the technological and legal forces moving the international
maritime community closer together,235 it is logical to maintain a case by case
approach that minimizes both risk to mariners and danger to coastal populations
and environmentally sensitive coastal areas.
The United States is already in some ways a model of public and private
cooperation in both preventing marine pollution and responding to it.236 Regional
Captains of the Port (COTP) coordinate extensively with the marine industry. 237
Government and industry work together in preparing contingency scenarios for
likely events.238 Rigorous enforcement of civil liability penalties, in addition to
the ever present possibility of bad press (no company wants to be the owner of the
219
next Exxon Valdez), provide the necessary incentives for private industry to
given area. AIS is akin to an air-traffic control system. See id In a shipboard emergency, an
AIS greatly reduces response time of professional search-and-rescue personnel. It also enhances
the ability of nearby commercial mariners to respond and assist. See id.
233 See Kavanaugh, supra note 12.
234 See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), supra note 228, at
http://www.imo.org/Convenfions/contents.asp?topic-id=257&doc-id=647#9.
235 See Introduction to the IMO, supra note 169.
236 See Robert C. North, Ten Years Later... Oil Spill Prevention and Response in the
United States, COAST GUARD J. SAFETY SEA, Jan.-Mar. 1999, at 1-18, available at
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/pubs/proceed/insert99.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2002). Since
passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), the average number of oil spills over 10,000
gallons in the United States has dropped by fifty percent. See id at 7. In fact, "the total volume
of tankship oil spills in the U.S. peaked in 1989 and has remained below 200,000 gallons since
1991." Id. After OPA 90, the United States implemented the Response Management System,
which is described as follows:
Response Management System: The National Contingency Plan requires On-Scene
Coordinators (OSCs) to direct response efforts and coordinate all actions at the scene of a
spill or release. There are 47 OSCs at Marine Safety Offices and Activities located at
strategic ports around the country. A response management system brings together federal
and state governments, and the responsible party .... This allhazard/allisk response
management system has enabled much more effective response efforts since its adoption.
Id. at 10-11.
237 See id. at 7-12.
238 See id.
239 The Exxon Valdez spilled more than ten million gallons of oil in Prince William
Sound, Alaska, when it ran aground on a reef in 1989. See Elizabeth R. Millard, Anatomy of an
Oil Spill: The Exxon Valdez and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 18 SEToN HALL LEGIs. J. 331,
331 (1993). The words Exxon Valdez have come to "symbolize the devastation and disaster that
accompany large scale spills." Id Simply put, companies have strong and obvious financial,
legal, and public relations incentives to be certain that one of their ships does not become
similarly synonymous with environmental catastrophe.
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cooperate.240 The practice in the United States of preventing marine casualties
and responding to them on a case by case basis, particularly over the past decade,
provides a viable alternative to the scheme under consideration by the IMO.
Masters of vessels that become in distress should be clear in communicating
with coastal states that they are only seeking a place of shelter.241 Coastal
authorities might be more willing to grant a vessel entry into protected waters
than they would be to allow it access to a port facility located near a populated
area.242 An initial miscommunication or misunderstanding could be enough to
arouse the domestic political concerns that motivate states to keep disabled ships
away from their shores in the first place.243 By being absolutely clear in the initial
communication that a ship is only seeking a temporary shelter from severe sea
and weather conditions and that such shelter need not be a port (it might only be
getting a lee from a coastal peninsula or island),244 distress requests might have a
better chance of being granted. 245
Lastly, the current lack of viability of the doctrine of force majeure and the
prospect of greater regulation for an already heavily regulated industry serve as
warning and motivation to private shipping companies and to classification
societies, such as the American Bureau of Shipping.246 Ultimately these
companies and their vessels are the ones likely to be stranded at sea.247 In the
short term, and perhaps the long term as well, the real answer may lie in vigorous
efforts by private entities targeted at eliminating substandard shipping.248
24 0 See North, supra note 236, at 13-14.
241 See Montreal-IMO Shipping Safety Culture Also Applies to Ports Says O'Neil, supra
note 11.
242 "Mr. Tsavliris described 'port of refuge' as a 'misconstrued term' and said that while
'most people thought we wanted to come into a sophisticated port, we were referring to a place
of shelter."' Speares, supra note 125.
243 See A Refuge-Between a Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 160.
244 To get a lee means to take shelter on the leeward side of a body of land. If the wind is
blowing from the north, a distressed ship might get a lee by anchoring on the south side of an
island and thus be protected from the elements. See KNIGHT'S MODERN SEAMANSHIP, supra
note 136, § 11.17, at 324-25.
245 See Montreal-IMO Shipping Safety Culture Also Applies to Ports Says O'Neil, supra
note 11:
To be clear a disabled vessel such as the Castor does not necessarily need to enter a port.
When dealing with ships in distress, the requirement is to find them an area of sheltered
water where the situation can be stabilised, the cargo made safe and the salvors and
authorities can evaluate what further steps are necessary without the pressure of a crisis-
frequently political-hanging over their heads.
246 See Hughes, supra note 55.
247 See 'Super-rust' Threat, supra note 55.
248 "IMO chairman William O'Neil said in a low-key speech that the shipping industry
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VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Erika and Castor incidents suggest that coastal states are
increasingly unlikely to recognize a distressed ship's right of entry. The Erika and
Castor incidents also demonstrate that forcing disabled ships to stay at sea is a
dangerous proposition for both maritime crews and coastal populations. The IMO
is attempting to address this problem by adopting pre-designated places of refuge.
As discussed above, though, the IMO's efforts here, while well intended, will
probably not solve the problem.
Alternatively, the IMO should continue to focus on doing what it does best-
raising international shipping standards and encouraging flag state responsibility.
At the same time, the right of entry for vessels in distress should be preserved.
Isolated incidents like the Erika and the Castor should be dealt with on a case by
case basis. Rather than forcing all disabled vessels, no matter what their particular
circumstances, to transit to a perhaps distant pre-designated place of refuge, a case
by case approach would allow coastal authorities and professional mariners to
work together to make the best of a bad situation-preserving life and property at
sea, while protecting coastal areas and coastal populations.
'must take action together.' He claimed there was underway 'a quiet revolution in the safety of
shipping' with most voyages completed without incident." Bray, supra note 57.
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